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      <title>Sebastian Spicker</title>
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      <title>GitHub Stars Are for Sale, and the Real Problem Is Not Vanity</title>
      <link>https://sebastianspicker.github.io/posts/github-stars-reputation-laundering/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>Buying GitHub stars sounds pathetic enough to be a joke. The joke misses the interesting part. Stars are a public trust signal on a code-hosting platform, and there is an ordinary, low-friction market for faking them. The important question is not whether inflated stars reliably produce downloads. It is why counterfeit popularity is so cheap to buy, and why that becomes a security problem once fake credibility attaches to malicious repositories.</description>
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