TL;DR

The slogan “Aus der Nähe betrachtet ist keiner normal”—“Up close, nobody is normal”—annoyed me. I read it as dissolving the distinction between ordinary variation and severe psychiatric illness, then built a Karneval (“carnival”) roast around that reading.

The roast was sharper than the evidence.

Modern diagnosis does use impairment, distress, duration, exclusions, and syndrome-specific thresholds. But that does not make a continuum framing clinically incoherent. A 2021 systematic review and meta-analysis found that continuum beliefs were generally, if weakly, associated with lower stigma; interventions successfully shifted those beliefs but had mixed effects on stigmatising attitudes [[1]]. The slogan may be incomplete or ambiguous. I cannot defend the claim that it actively harms the people a psychiatric centre serves.

The Reading I Brought to the Poster

I took the slogan’s implied argument to be:

Nobody is normal, therefore the normal/disordered distinction is arbitrary, therefore psychiatric diagnoses are arbitrary.

That conclusion would indeed be bad. People with severe, impairing conditions need their suffering, treatment needs, and claim on resources taken seriously. “Everyone gets depressed sometimes” can be a dismissal, just as casual use of OCD can erase the severity of obsessive-compulsive disorder.

But the poster does not contain my syllogism. A continuum claim can instead mean that symptoms and experiences vary in degree, that categorical labels do not make people a different kind of human, and that a clinical threshold can remain meaningful on a continuous distribution. Blood pressure is continuous; clinical decisions still use thresholds. The existence of a threshold does not require two metaphysically separate species of person.

What Psychiatric Classification Actually Claims

Jerome Wakefield’s harmful-dysfunction analysis combines a factual dysfunction with harm judged in a social context [[2]]. It is influential and contested; it is not simply “the definition psychiatry uses.”

DSM-5-TR defines a mental disorder in terms of a clinically significant disturbance reflecting dysfunction in psychological, biological, or developmental processes, usually associated with significant distress or disability [[3]]. Individual diagnostic criteria vary. Not every diagnosis has one generic “clinical significance criterion,” and neither the manual nor Wakefield makes psychiatric boundaries free of judgment or controversy.

Christopher Boorse’s account of health as species-typical biological functioning is another philosophical proposal [[4]]. It cannot be imported as the uncontested operating rule of psychiatric diagnosis. Statistical deviation, dysfunction, distress, impairment, duration, culture, risk, and values enter different classifications in different ways.

The correction is not that diagnosis has no thresholds. It is that thresholds and continua can coexist.

Concept Creep Is a Different Claim

Nick Haslam describes concept creep: harm-related concepts can expand horizontally to new phenomena and vertically to less severe cases [[5]]. He argues that this expansion has ambivalent implications, including a risk of pathologising ordinary experience.

My original article turned that risk into a demonstrated dilution effect: if a concept covers milder cases, people with severe illness necessarily lose recognition and resources. Haslam’s 2016 paper does not establish that causal chain, and this poster is not evidence that a diagnostic category has expanded. “Nobody is normal” is a continuum message; concept creep concerns changing concept boundaries. They can interact, but they are not synonyms.

Allen Frances’s Saving Normal is a forceful critique of diagnostic inflation [[6]]. It is an argument in a contested nosological debate, not proof that normalisation slogans undermine clinical care.

What the Anti-Stigma Evidence Says

The most directly relevant source was missing from my original roast. Peter and colleagues reviewed 33 studies of continuum beliefs and mental-illness stigma; 13 contributed to meta-analysis [[1]]. On five of the seven outcomes they could pool, the correlation is significant and points towards less stigma (Fig. 1): respondents with stronger continuum beliefs wanted less social distance (r = −0.17, 95% CI −0.22 to −0.12), saw less unpredictability and dangerousness, felt less fear, and reported more pro-social reactions. Anger and attributed responsibility showed no significant association.

Figure 1. Continuum beliefs go with significantly less stigma on five of seven outcomes, and no pooled correlation reaches 0.2. Pooled correlations with 95% intervals from Table 1 of Peter et al. [[1]], some imputed from regression coefficients; effect sizes in parentheses; filled dots exclude zero. Pro-social reactions are reversed in sign (published r = 0.15), so left of zero always means less stigma. Anger is +0.05 as in supplementary Table S4.3; Table 1 prints −0.05, outside its own interval.

These are small correlations; the authors call the social-distance result “a small negative association” [[1]]. Squared, r = −0.17 is about 3% of the variance, a blend of bivariate correlations (−0.20 pooled alone, 4%) and partial correlations from regression models (−0.09, under 1%); the percentages are mine. Heterogeneity was high (I² 77–95%). The stereotype results rest almost entirely on schizophrenia. For depression, neither social distance nor fear reached significance; the authors suggest a ceiling effect, as associations were strongest where stigma is most severe.

That does not prove this poster works. Correlation is not intervention, most studies concerned depression or schizophrenia, and much of the evidence came from Germany and the United States. Of eleven experiments that manipulated continuum beliefs directly, all but one moved them. Of the seven that measured desire for social distance, two found a reduction, one a marginal reduction and four none; two found more fear or anger after the message [[1]]. One of the two reductions came from a German online experiment with a quota sample of 1,679: compared with no text, a text about the continuum reduced perceived difference by 0.19 and raised social acceptance by 0.18 standard deviations [[7]]. A text read during a survey is not a poster glimpsed on a wall, and a fifth of a standard deviation is a modest shift. Broader programmes that mixed in continuum messages, among them a German public campaign, reduced stigma at least partly in most general-population samples but not in a caregiver therapy or a professionals’ workshop, and none isolated the message [[1]].

The authors emphasise identification—creating a sense of “us”—and recommend further study rather than a slogan-only cure. Their most common measure, from a German survey by Schomerus and colleagues [[8]], asks for agreement with “Basically we are all sometimes like [person X]. It is just a question how pronounced this state is” [[1]]. Peter and colleagues argue that general statements about symptoms, unlike this item, can be endorsed while still seeing people with mental illness as an out-group, and that relating respondents personally to the continuum could be what matters. Their own subgroups point the other way: general items correlate more strongly with social distance (−0.24 against −0.14) and fear (−0.15 against −0.05), although the two groups also differ in statistics and samples. The poster’s keiner (“nobody”) includes whoever reads it, which puts it nearer the self-including item; whether that helps is untested.

Corrigan and Penn’s earlier review distinguishes protest, education, and contact strategies [[9]]. It warns that protest can rebound, education can meet resilient stereotypes, and contact is enhanced by a variety of factors, including equal status, cooperative interaction, and institutional support. It does not say that normalisation campaigns reduce perceived severity or treatment support, as I previously claimed.

Kvaale and colleagues’ review of 28 studies, feeding four meta-analyses (N = 1,207–3,469), found that biogenetic explanations reduce blame (Hedges' g = −0.32) but increase prognostic pessimism (g = 0.26) and perceived dangerousness (g = 0.20, which could reflect publication bias), and typically leave social distance unchanged [[10]]. Biogenetic framing is not a valid proxy for continuum framing. That citation did not support my argument and no longer does that work here.

The Institution Is Not Contradicting Itself

A Sozialpsychiatrisches Zentrum (“social-psychiatric centre”, a community service offering counselling, a drop-in, supported housing, and help with work) can believe both of the following:

  • mental experiences and symptoms vary continuously across people; and
  • some people cross thresholds at which specialised support is warranted.

There is no contradiction. Services already make decisions using need, impairment, risk, eligibility, and available resources. Saying that users are not a separate human category does not imply that everyone needs the same service.

The heart analogy from my original article survives in reverse. Nobody has an anatomically identical heart, cardiovascular variables are continuous, and specific cardiac conditions still warrant treatment. The continuum does not dissolve the clinical category. It explains why variation and thresholds must be discussed separately.

What I Would Put on the Wall

I still prefer messaging that preserves severity and material need:

Mental illness is real. It does not make anyone less whole, less worthy, or less one of us.

That is a judgment about language, not a finding that the existing slogan is harmful. The evidence gives continuum messages a legitimate place in anti-stigma work, plausibly most of all when they create identification rather than merely announcing that categories are fuzzy. It also leaves room to say that severe conditions require treatment, accommodation, and resources.

Karneval rewards an overconfident prosecutor. Research requires a less satisfying ending. I went looking for citations to support the roast and found one that required me to retract it.

The poster can stay on the wall.

Clinical and anti-stigma literature checked through 2026-10-25.


References

[1] Peter, L.-J., Schindler, S., Sander, C., et al. (2021). Continuum beliefs and mental illness stigma: A systematic review and meta-analysis of correlation and intervention studies. Psychological Medicine, 51(5), 716–726. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291721000854

[2] Wakefield, J. C. (1992). The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological facts and social values. American Psychologist, 47(3), 373–388. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.47.3.373

[3] American Psychiatric Association. (2022). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed., text rev.). American Psychiatric Association Publishing.

[4] Boorse, C. (1977). Health as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of Science, 44(4), 542–573. https://doi.org/10.1086/288768

[5] Haslam, N. (2016). Concept creep: Psychology’s expanding concepts of harm and pathology. Psychological Inquiry, 27(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2016.1082418

[6] Frances, A. (2013). Saving Normal: An Insider’s Revolt against Out-of-Control Psychiatric Diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the Medicalization of Ordinary Life. HarperCollins.

[7] Schomerus, G., Angermeyer, M. C., Baumeister, S. E., Stolzenburg, S., Link, B. G., & Phelan, J. C. (2016). An online intervention using information on the mental health–mental illness continuum to reduce stigma. European Psychiatry, 32, 21–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2015.11.006

[8] Schomerus, G., Matschinger, H., & Angermeyer, M. C. (2013). Continuum beliefs and stigmatizing attitudes towards persons with schizophrenia, depression and alcohol dependence. Psychiatry Research, 209(3), 665–669. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2013.02.006

[9] Corrigan, P. W., & Penn, D. L. (1999). Lessons from social psychology on discrediting psychiatric stigma. American Psychologist, 54(9), 765–776. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.54.9.765

[10] Kvaale, E. P., Haslam, N., & Gottdiener, W. H. (2013). The “side effects” of medicalization: A meta-analytic review of how biogenetic explanations affect stigma. Clinical Psychology Review, 33(6), 782–794. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2013.06.002


Changelog

  • 2026-07-11: Reversed the article’s central verdict after adding the directly relevant continuum-beliefs meta-analysis; corrected claims about DSM criteria, harmful dysfunction, concept creep, contact, and biogenetic framing; and removed the unsupported assertion that the slogan harms service users or contradicts the institution’s mission.
  • 2026-10-25: Added the pooled correlations of Peter et al. (2021) with their confidence intervals, and Fig. 1, transcribed from the paper’s Table 1. Corrected the account of that meta-analysis: lower perceived difference came from three intervention studies, not from the pooled correlations, and the associations did not hold “across outcomes and conditions” (anger and attributed responsibility showed no significant association; in depression, neither social distance nor fear did); all are small, with |r| at most 0.18, so the summary now says “generally, if weakly”. Noted that Table 1 prints the anger estimate as −0.05, outside its own interval, where the supplement gives +0.05. Added the variance these correlations explain (about 3% for social distance, 4% for bivariate and under 1% for partial correlations pooled separately), the high heterogeneity, the reliance of the stereotype results on schizophrenia, and the authors’ ceiling-effect explanation for depression. Added the experimental results (of the seven experiments that measured social distance, two found a reduction, one a marginal reduction and four none; two found more fear or anger), the German online experiment of Schomerus et al. (2016), and the broader programmes, which reduced stigma in most general-population samples but not in a caregiver therapy or a professionals’ workshop. Added the authors’ identification argument with the continuum item of Schomerus et al. (2013), noted that their own subgroups point the other way, and added my untested reading that the poster’s keiner includes the reader; softened “especially when they create identification” to “plausibly most of all”. Replaced “contact works under conditions” with Corrigan and Penn’s “enhanced by a variety of factors, including”, and added Kvaale et al.’s effect sizes. Glossed Karneval and Sozialpsychiatrisches Zentrum. Renamed the reference anchors so that the citation markers link to the bibliography, which they did not; with the two Schomerus papers added as [7] and [8], Corrigan and Penn moved from [7] to [9] and Kvaale et al. from [8] to [10]. Added the quotation marks around “side effects” in the Kvaale et al. title.